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Economic evaluations in health (EEHs) take 
many forms. However, they generally involve 
a comparison of inputs and outcomes, either 
of which may or may not be market-traded 
goods. 
We call a particular choice of inputs and 
outcomes a ‘table of accounts’. We argue 
that the notion of a table of accounts 
provides a useful way to understand the 
methodological diversity of EEHs, which 
subsumes more established but also more 
restrictive terminology (e.g. the notion of 
‘study perspective’). 
Our concept of a table of accounts can 
also be thought of as a more structured 
and theoretically grounded instance of 
the currently popular notion of ‘value 
frameworks’. We present tables of account for 
a number of commonly used EEHs, then we 
discuss at length benefit-cost analysis (BCA), 
a distinctive form of EEH that has recently 
attracted substantial attention. 
In addition to the table of accounts, a BCA also 
relies on a table of values: understanding the 
table of values is key to understanding both 
the appeal of BCA and also its vulnerabilities. 
We conclude with reflections on when and 
for whom BCA may be an attractive form of 
analysis compared with other forms of EEH, 
such as cost-effectiveness analysis. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
11. BACKGROUND
Improvements in medical technology and an 
ageing global population mean that healthcare 
has a greater role in securing human well-
being, and also a greater economic footprint, 
now than at any previous time in history. In 
many countries, as well as at the international 
level, those responsible for providing and 
paying for health services explicitly recognize 
that not all effective medical technologies 
and services are affordable. Decisions about 
whether to adopt technologies and services 
in publicly funded benefit packages, for 
example, typically involve balancing health 
gains against the other socially valuable uses 
to which the resources required could be put 
(opportunity cost). This is done increasingly 
explicitly, on the basis of analyses that build 
upwards from the biomedical evidence to 
create nested sets of information that support 
decision makers in coming to judgements 
about value for money in health. Any such 
type of analysis is what we call an economic 
evaluation in health (EEH). 
INTRODUCTION
Economic evaluations in health are related to 
the broader domains of planning, management, 
and evaluation science, which for our 
purposes explicitly include project evaluation 
[1], impact assessment for development (now 
usually called ‘theory of change’) [2], results-
based management [3], but also – somewhat 
farther afield – realist evaluation [4]. Except 
when distinctions are important, we loosely 
refer to these and related disciplines with 
the umbrella term ‘management science’. 
Evaluations in health share significant 
common points with management science and 
increasingly share a common terminology. 
Not surprisingly, economic evaluations have 
also been much influenced by the methods 
and theories of economics, and in particular 
by the work of two influential post-war 
women economists, Dorothy Rice and Selma 
Mushkin [5, 6, 7, 8]. The post-war context 
was important for economic evaluations for at 
least three reasons. 
First, the war spurred technological and social 
advancement and, as a result, sharpened 
awareness of the need to plan, conduct and 
evaluate large-scale collective undertakings, 
such as warfare. In this sense, the roots of 
modern management science go back at least 
as far as the revolution in military theory 
and practice begun in 19th century Prussia 
through the work of career soldiers Carl 
von Clausewitz and Helmuth von Moltke 
who, drawing lessons from the Napoleonic 
Wars, formulated and tested new theories of 
war, of which modern management science 
happens to be a direct descendant. These 
writers introduced conceptual innovations 
that are still highly salient for management 
science: a distinction between levels of 
result (for example, outputs, outcomes and 
impact) and an explicit recognition of the role 
of uncertainty and feedback effects in the 
prosecution of complex plans. 
The second reason is that the war coincided 
with a massive growth in the role of the 
state in the former warring countries and 
the concomitant expansion, in the West, 
of direct taxation (e.g. income taxes) as a 
primary means of financing public budgets. 
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As a result, in the post-war period the public 
sector achieved a new prominence – one that 
had thitherto been inconceivable – in the lives 
of the citizens of these countries. These two 
features (the development of management 
science as an extension of the theory of war 
and an unprecedented expansion of the 
public sphere) together formed the basis of 
the modern, technocratic approach to public 
governance, within which management 
science remains a determining element. 
The third reason is that the period immediately 
before, during, and after the Second 
World War corresponded with the entry of 
economics (and economists) for the first time 
in history into the highest spheres of public 
policy, as exemplified by the work and lives of 
John Maynard Keynes in the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
John Kenneth Galbraith in the United States 
of America. Ever since, and regardless of the 
political allegiances of influential economists, 
economics has maintained a dominant role 
[9] in public policy and administration,
explaining in part the overwhelming
importance of economic ideas and theories
within management science. In other words,
since the post-war period both the objectives
and results of collective social undertakings,
public and private, have generally and
wherever possible been conceptualized,
measured and evaluated in economic terms.
CONTEXT
Globally, health systems are diverse, with 
varying institutional arrangements and 
stakeholder constellations. Nevertheless, the 
hitherto predominant form of EEH, cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA), was developed 
and refined in response to the demands of 
particular settings during the latter half of 
the 20th century, namely those of the health 
services in the United States, Canada and 
England. A selection of foundational pieces 
is given here [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21]; later consolidations are cited 
here [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. For the reasons 
mentioned in the preceding section, there was 
an evident perception by decision-makers in 
those settings of a duty to improve population 
health through the regulation, financing, or 
direct oversight of health services. Indeed, 
the 1980 report of the Office of Technology 
Assessment of the United States Congress cites 
over 650 applications of economic analysis 
to healthcare, virtually all done during the 
1970s, a substantial minority of which were 
published by government agencies [22]. 
Subsequently, in the early years of the 21st 
century, staff at the Secretariat of the World 
Health Organization, and others, became 
interested in applying the methods of CEA to 
health problems in developing countries [27], 
and hundreds of applications of economic 
analysis to global health have since appeared. 
Far from waning, the interest in evaluating 
health programmes in developing countries 
with respect to delivering value for money 
has become even more evident recently, with, 
among other developments, the founding of 
the International Decision Support Initiative 
[28], and important innovations in the use 
of CEA by a variety of domestic stakeholders 
and decision-makers in both developing and 
emerging economies [29, 30, 31, 32]. These 
latter contributions, in particular, renew the 
impetus to develop a new understanding 
of the method and practice of economic 
evaluation, one that is fit for purpose for 
current problems in global health. An 
example of this kind of thought development 
is [33]; the present extended essay is a further 
extension and crystallization of the research 
insights contained in [29, 30, 31, 32]. 
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The technical basis of EEHs has accordingly 
evolved in response to the challenges of 
supporting decision-making in varying 
jurisdictions. The principal emerging trend, 
however, has been that non-economists, 
in particular, members of the diverse 
professional communities active in global 
health, international health, and public health 
[34], including policy makers, ethicists, 
political representatives, researchers, project 
managers, donors, health technical experts, 
and programme specialists – as well as health 
economists – have recently been citing, 
using, commissioning and conducting EEHs. 
Although on the one hand a mere extension 
of post-war trends within management 
science, this recent development nevertheless 
represents a striking demoticization of 
economics within the field of health: it is 
now safe to say that EEHs are no longer the 
privileged domain of specialist technocrats. A 
new trans- (and not merely multi-) discipline 
is thus emerging. 
To bridge gaps in understanding across a 
diversity of audiences, where participants 
struggle with familiar words being used in 
unfamiliar ways, in this paper we offer a 
unified framework for thinking about the 
forms that EEHs may take. Copious technical 
information is available elsewhere about 
the methods of EEHs, most of which has 
been consolidated in the references [22, 23, 
24, 25, 26, 27]. Here we propose merely to 
organize the concepts of EEHs in a way that 
should be understandable by and acceptable 
to health economists as well as to members of 
other professional communities and which, in 
addition, provides insights into controversies 
and points of confusion that have bedevilled 
specialists and non-specialists alike. 
Specifically, we discuss the pros and cons 
of benefit-cost analysis and in particular 
one sub-type of benefit-cost analysis (“the 
investment case”) that is currently popular in 
the global health economics literature. 
Our survey is limited in scope: study types 
that we do not address in detail are described 
in the next section. 
EXCLUDED TYPES 
OF ANALYSIS
MCDA AND PROCEDURAL 
DECISION AIDS
We do not discuss methods based on multi-
criteria decision analysis (MCDA), although 
these have also recently been popular. MCDA, 
in our understanding, rests on a different 
philosophical foundation from that of the main 
streams in economic evaluation. The methods 
of EEH discussed here fix their principal roots 
in consequentialism1, namely, the ethical 
theory that actions can and should be judged 
solely by their outcomes, or consequences. 
Implicit in this orientation is the claim that 
causal modelling, such as logical framework 
analysis [1] or randomized controlled trials, 
can capture and organize knowledge about 
states of the world in ways that are relevant 
for decision-making. 
MCDA methods, on the other hand, are based 
on proceduralism, a rules-based conception 
of decision-making according to which 
decisions are only partially (if at all) justified 
with reference to the goals stakeholders may 
have regarding outcomes, but where it is held 
that descriptive modelling (e.g. ‘deliberative 
discourse’) can structure and make explicit 
the reasons for actors’ decisions, thereby 
1  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/. While 
non-consequentialist accounts of EEH are possible, we 
believe they shed less light. 
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establishing the possibility of ‘accountability 
for reasonableness’ [35]. 
These are stylized distinctions. The 
frameworks we present are intended as ways 
of organizing conversations about different 
forms of causal EEHs; they are less useful 
for conversations about MCDA or other 
proceduralist methods. Nonetheless, we 
believe that MCDA and similar proceduralist 
approaches can support in a powerful way 
the institutional and political context in 
which decisions are made. For example, they 
help in promoting the public and professional 
credibility of EEHs and are, to that extent, 
highly complementary to consequentialist 
methods. Although our main business here is 
with consequentialist EEHs, our overall view is 
that hybrid approaches in which institutional, 
legal, and other procedural values supervene 
on a set of core consequentialist concerns 
appear very promising.2
VALUE FRAMEWORKS AND VALUE 
PROPOSITIONS
Another idea which has lately become popular 
is the value framework [36]. More than two 
dozen value frameworks, some of which 
are explicitly advocacy-oriented, have been 
proposed in recent years, for example for 
cancer drugs, vaccines and medical devices 
[Table 1, 36]. The International Society for 
Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research 
(ISPOR) recently concluded a review of such 
value frameworks with a caution [36]:
[T]hese … frameworks … raise important 
questions and potential concerns. … [I]t is 
essential to scrutinize whether the frameworks 
use approaches that are transparent as well 
2  A familiar example of such a hybrid approach is health 
technology assessment, such as exemplified by NICE or 
HITAP, where an EEH is usually just one input (and perhaps 
merely a heuristic aid) to a decision-making process. 
as conceptually and methodologically sound. 
By attempting to simplify the problem of value 
assessment, these new frameworks could end up 
making ad hoc assumptions and simplifications 
not supported by theory or evidence…. 
ISPOR’s review [37], which was arguably 
intended to lend structure to a chaotic 
discourse, has nevertheless been criticized 
both by health economists [38] and patient 
representatives [39], though apparently 
welcomed by industry stakeholders [40]. 
Similarly, the term value proposition is now 
being adopted in health. Value propositions 
were originally conceived of as one of the 
core functions of a business model, namely, 
“to articulate … the value created for users 
by the offering based on the technology” 
[41]. At least in the sense of [41], a value 
proposition is necessarily, albeit often only 
implicitly, expressed in the mere embodiment 
of a technology in a product. However, the 
notion of value propositions is now proposed 
as a conceptual model useful for clarifying 
how incentives faced by stakeholders on 
the supply side (investors, managers, and 
innovators) and the demand side (purchasers, 
regulators, and policy-makers) facilitate (or 
interfere with) the development of effective 
medicines and vaccines for use in global 
health. Formulating and comparing explicit 
value propositions has been proposed as a tool 
for understanding how diverse actors might 
better align, so that coordination problems 
can be explicitly managed [42, 43, 44, 45]. 
Although they share some properties 
with EEHs, value propositions and value 
frameworks should not be understood 
as belonging to the family of evaluation 
research methods we discuss here. Rather, 
they can be understood as useful tools for 
rendering explicit (and hence auditable) the 
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transactional interests of diverse actors. In this, 
they definitely belong to the broader domain 
of management science. Notwithstanding 
their usefulness for clarifying, for example, 
the diverse incentives faced by entrepreneurs, 
investors, manufacturers, regulators, 
purchasers, providers, consumers – or by 
the representatives of such groups – value 
propositions and value frameworks are in 
our view not, at least without substantial 
modification, suitable for use as decision-
making tools in public policy. Indeed, writing 
for ISPOR, Neumann et al. note that the 
emergence of value frameworks in the United 
States private sector can largely be attributed 
to the waning role of the public sphere in the 
largest medical market in the world [36]. 
We now return to our primary narrative about 
causal EEHs as technocratic approaches to 
public-sector decision-making in health. 
OUTLINE
The principal explanatory device we introduce 
is a table of accounts. We use this device in 
two ways: 
(i)  to provide a systematic overview of the
most common forms of EEH to be found
in the health economics and global health
literature; and
(ii)  to structure a commentary on and critique
of benefit-cost analysis (BCA), a form of
EEH which has been recently advocated
by some and criticized by others.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In 
Section 2 we define key terms; in Section 
3 we lay out and use the table of accounts 
to compare eight different forms of EEH: 
effectiveness studies; costing studies; 
cost-effectiveness studies; distributional 
cost-effectiveness studies; extended cost-
effectiveness studies; cost-of-illness studies; 
benefit-cost analysis; and the investment 
case for health, highlighting similarities 
and differences, thus meeting objective (i). 
Objective (ii) occupies Section 4 and consists 
of an extended discussion of benefit-cost 
analysis as it applies to health using the 
concept of the table of accounts in conjunction 
with a related concept that we describe in 
that section called a table of values; Section 
5 concludes. 
6The main terms we shall use are defined in Table 1. Some glosses are provided in the text that 
follows. 
2. DEFINING TERMS
Table 1: Key definitions of terms as used here, cross-references in the table shown in italics
Term Definition
Accounting A system for counting, recording and interpreting debits and credits, usually in a ledger.
Accounting framework The complete set of criteria affecting what is counted and how it is recorded and 
interpreted for decision-making in an EEH.
Actions Human behaviour undertaken with the aim of realizing an intervention, plan, or project. 
Actions are thus an input.
Benefit A positive outcome expressed either in natural units (like fewer bed–days) or in 
constructed units (like QALYs).
Cause A set of interventions, conditions or actions that reliably produce, or tend to produce, an 
effect (e.g. “reckless driving causes accidents”).
Counterfactual The state of the world as it would otherwise have been but for a specific intervention.
Effect Outcomes that are reliably produced, or tend to be produced, by a cause.
Efficiency A measure of how economically resources produce desired results, usually expressed as a 
ratio of outcomes to inputs. In economics, an efficient intervention minimizes the cost of 
attaining a given outcome, alternatively maximizes the benefit for a given cost.
Health A state pertaining to human beings usually defined, positively, in terms of variables 
measuring health-related quality of life (e.g. abilities to function, freedom from anxiety or 
pain) or, negatively, in terms of absences (e.g. of disability).
Healthy life–year A year of life experienced by a person in perfect health.
Inputs The resources that are required to perform the intervention or generate an outcome.
Intervention A set of inputs whose combination in a prescribed way reliably achieves a desired effect; 
the intervention causes the desired effect.
Ledger A repository of accounting information relating to an intervention, plan, or project.
Logical framework A device (usually tabular) identifying intervention elements (e.g. inputs, actions, outputs, 
outcomes, impact) and their causal relationships.




Market traded is a term describing resources that can be bought and sold on markets or 
by means of contracts and whose value is denominated in monetary terms.
Non-market traded is a term applied to resources that are not bought or sold with money. 
Natural units The generic name of a resource that is used when counting with the natural numbers 
(e.g. 2 pencils, 3 hours of labour, 1 electron microscope) rather than by conversion to a 
constructed measure (like a QALY) or a common unit of account (e.g. $1, $2, $3, …).
Opportunity cost The value of the most highly valued outcome that is forgone in dedicating resources 
(material or immaterial) to a given course of action.
Outcome A change in the state of the world, such as the health of an individual or a population 
resulting from an action or course of action. An outcome is one of the consequences of an 
action. An outcome can be either positive (good) or negative (bad).
7defInIng terms
We say that an economic evaluation is done in 
health when the main outcomes of interest are 
health outcomes; similarly, when the defining 
purpose of an intervention is to improve 
health, we call it a health intervention. In 
this paper, we mainly leave open the question 
of which specific health outcomes are of 
interest. Similarly, we leave open the question 
of whether the effects of interventions relate 
to individuals or to whole populations or sub-
populations, and of whether the interventions 
themselves are preventive or restorative or 
are public-health measures. Naturally, health 
interventions can have non-health outcomes 
just as non-health interventions can have 
health outcomes, and we return to this point 
in Section 3. 
EEHs are inherently comparative. The need 
to make complex comparisons easier explains 
the tendency in EEHs to summarize results 
in a few numbers, since the compression 
of information facilitates its retention, 
comparison and communication. The 
comparisons EEHs propose are numerical: 
such as “3 is less than 5”, or “3/5 is less than 
2/3”. Because the answers are numerical, 
one might be tempted to claim that EEHs 
are mere counting exercises. However, 
comparisons require common denominators, 
such as uniform definitions of the cost of 
inputs, as well as a common unit of account 
for outcomes, such as health. Before we can 
compare inputs, outcomes, or their numerical 
ratios, we first need to count the elements 
being appraised. All EEHs thus depend at 
base on an accounting exercise. 
THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
AND THE CAUSAL STORY
EEHs also rely on a logical framework whereby 
a set of inputs is systematically linked to 
a set of outcomes. The logical framework 
may also identify indicators of success or 
highlight assumptions and risks influencing 
the outcome. In the logical framework, inputs 
(combined as required in the intervention) 
can be called causes of the outcomes, and 
the outcomes, effects of the inputs. Such a 
framework is commonly called a model.
Table 1: Contd.
Term Definition
Output The product or immediate result of an intervention, plan, or project, usually measured in 
natural units.
Perspective In general, the point of view from which a (possibly hypothetical) observer would assess 
an intervention, plan, or project. Specifically, a summary term expressing what count as 
debits and credits in the ledger.
Price The value, usually expressed in monetary units of account (e.g. dollars), of an input, 
output, outcome or resource.
Resource An economic (i.e. scarce) good, human, material or immaterial.
Table of accounts A concise representation of the accounting framework in tabular form.
Unit of account A unit used for measuring and counting resources (e.g. natural units, monetary units, or 
constructed measures such as QALYs).
Value/Market value Value is any measure denoting the relative importance of goods or resources.
Market value is the price paid in money for resources (material or immaterial) and outputs 
on the market. 
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A model encapsulates a (causal) story: “if 
you do this, then that will result”. This is a 
useful metaphor since most stories involve a 
simplification of reality and require the use of 
imagination on the part of the listener. The 
basic structure of most intervention stories is 
shown in Figure 1. In the terminology used 
here, the decision-maker can be called the 
observer. She is the intended audience of the 
story, the one for whom the EEH is performed. 
She may be an actual person (like a minister 
of health or the senior outcomes manager 
of a pharmaceutical firm); alternatively, the 
observer can be a committee that makes 
decisions or recommendations. Moreover, the 
observer may occasionally be an hypothetical, 
legal, or even merely conventional construct 
(for example “society”, “the health system”, 
or a particular institution therein); in such 
cases the “observer” might fairly be called an 
invention of the analyst. Deciding who is the 
observer is one of the foundations of any EEH, 
and it depends on context and circumstances 
– often the observer is whoever going to pay
for the analysis, or the principal represented
by the payer. However, it would be a mistake
to insist that observers must always be actual
agents or their principals.
Outcomes describe a change in the state of 
the world resulting from an action or course 
of action; outcomes provide an aim, or reason, 
for the action. This is the definition commonly 
used in ethics3. In health economics and EEHs 
more generally, however, the outcome usually 
refers to the impact of the intervention on 
health (and its distribution). In results-based 
management, outcomes are understood to 
be (limited to) the “short-term and medium-
term effects” of an intervention’s outputs [3]. 
This is not the case in an EEH, where the time 
period considered is customarily determined 
by the duration over which consequences 
and costs are expected to accrue. Outputs 
are here used to describe the direct products 
of an intervention [3], closely related to 
the way the term is used in production 
theory: a production process uses inputs to 
produce outputs; outputs are the immediate 
result of an intervention, plan, or project. 
“Patients treated”, “the fraction of population 
inoculated”, “survey questionnaires delivered” 
are examples of outputs. Their principal use 
is for purposes of monitoring, and are often 
the same as throughputs and other measures 
of workload. An example of a throughput is 
“hospital deaths and discharges”. Distinct 
from other forms of management science, in 
an EEH the motivational factor is generally 
the outcome rather than output or throughput. 
3  In volume 1 of Derek Parfit’s On what matters, the word 
‘outcome’ appears nearly 200 times, whereas ‘output’ and 
‘impact’ are not used at all.
Figure 1: The story of an intervention in schematic form
Inputs OutcomesIntervention
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In succinct terms, EEHs represent a specific 
table of accounts corresponding to a specific 
logical framework. In many economic 
treatises [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27], however, the 
logical framework is only implicit or even not 
mentioned. This might be one of the reasons 
that the links of economic evaluation with 
management science are usually overlooked. 
Indeed, at least two of the insights explicitly 
considered central at the birth of management 
science have since mainly been observed 
in the breach: i) in economic evaluations it 
has become usual to elide elements in the 
results hierarchy, underestimating thereby 
the dependency of outcomes on intermediate 
results; ii) in management science more 
generally (including economic evaluations) it 
has become commonplace to ignore the fact 
that project implementation is an interactive 
process with important feedback effects. 
Both of these ideas were in the foreground 
of theories of war; as a more technocratic 
and economically oriented conception of 
management science has become dominant, 
however, those elements deriving from 
German idealist philosophy have been 
dropped, leaving only the structures 
congenial to non-Continental (i.e. analytical) 
philosophy. That said, the results hierarchy 
has been resurrected in the form of logical 
frameworks and related structures that are 
now considered mainly as of importance in 
non-economic evaluations such as project 
evaluation for development; feedback 
effects, on the other hand, come to the fore 
in realist evaluations and other derivatives 
of critical theory4. Pure proceduralist 
forms of evaluations such as MCDA in turn 
emphasize the fundamental value of respect 
for human agency and the importance of non-
coercive forms of persuasion (“deliberative 
4 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/.
discourse”). All of these ideas, including 
consequentialism, were nevertheless 
conjoined in the Enlightenment thought of 
Kant.
THE TABLE OF ACCOUNTS
To render legible the key features of economic 
evaluations to non-health economists 
interested in evaluation science in health, 
we introduce here the notion of a table of 
accounts. The table of accounts summarizes 
in a comprehensive yet concise manner what 
counts and, equally important, how it is 
interpreted in an EEH. While a great deal of 
both detail and generality can be derived from 
the study of a table of accounts, in introducing 
the concept we intentionally eschew calling 
attention to a number of features of evaluation 
studies that are generally considered central 
in health economics. Some are, however, 
mentioned in what follows. Our minimalist 
approach is motivated by the fact that even the 
closely related disciplines of health economics, 
benefit-cost analysis and welfare economics 
each have their own highly idiosyncratic 
terminology and conceptual framework. 
Moreover, our primary task is not to describe 
all the relevant features of any of these study 
types, but rather to uncover a structure that 
can serve to unify concepts across these fields 
while revealing common features and making 
explicit relevant differences. 
First and foremost, our table of accounts 
distinguishes effects from causes and market 
from non-market goods. A good table of 
accounts should also summarize, however, 
the intervention story, the logical framework, 
the perspective of the observer, the ethical 
views of the decision-maker and, as we shall 
see in Section 3, the specific technical framing 
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of the EEH. So the table of accounts encodes 
not only the information corresponding to 
items 1–7, 10–13, and 18–22 of the CHEERS 
checklist [46] but, in addition, captures in 
summary form the logical framework, the 
study type and the ethical position. A table 
of accounts will therefore typically be unique 
to the application in question. We refer to the 
table of accounts, when considered together 
with this broader set of implicit and explicit 
interpretive information, as an accounting 
framework. 
In the form we propose, entries in the table 
are initially recorded in natural units (i.e. 
quantities or numbers, Qs). Moreover, at 
least at first, it can be convenient to organize 
entries in terms of generic categories such as 
those shown in Table 2. As the most important 
economic features of an EEH can be brought 
into focus mainly by distinguishing inputs 
and outcomes that are market traded from 
those that are non-market traded, attention 
to these categories is key. 
The table of accounts shown in Table 2 has 
been constructed with a health intervention 
in mind, and so is intended to include the 
typical inputs and outcomes that decision-
makers (and technocrats) find important in 
EEHs. In a table of accounts intended for the 
evaluation of a specific health intervention 
one can replace the generic categories shown 
here with the names of specific items (e.g. 
aspirin, exercise and heart attacks avoided). 
UNITS OF ACCOUNT
Using life-years (or healthy life-years) to 
count health outcomes is typical in an EEH, 
although it is by no means required. Such 
units are usually called QALYs, DALYs or, 
occasionally, HALYs. The common basis behind 
such metrics is the life-table statistic person-
years, optionally adjusted by health status. 
Healthy life-years are thus a (constructed) 
unit of account for measuring different 
kinds of health outcomes on a comparable 
scale. Despite the currency of such measures, 
one should not underestimate the level of 
effort required to achieve the informational 
compression entailed in such constructed 
units of account. The chief advantage of using 
a constructed unit of account such as HALYs 
is that it facilitates measurement across 
diseases and interventions, and also accounts 
for the benefit of interventions that improve 
health-related quality of life. But, as we shall 
see later, comparability and compression 
can bring a cost in terms of the validity and 
reliability of a unit of account. 
Table 2: Generic table of accounts for an EEH of a health intervention (showing typical categories 
of interest)
Inputs (Qs) Outcomes (Qs)
Market-traded inputs and 
outcomes
• Paid work
• Equipment and machines
• Medicines and consumables
• Facilities
• Other market-traded inputs
• Increased productivity
• Increased labour supply




•  Beneficiaries’ unpaid work, e.g. travel 
and waiting time
•  Other unpaid work, e.g. family carers’ 
time
• Other non-market-traded inputs
• Increased years of life 
•  Increased health-related quality of life
•  Other non-market-traded outcomes 
(positive or negative)
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The unit of account invariably used to count 
inputs in an EEH is price (P). In addition to 
providing a common metric for aggregating 
and summarizing inputs, prices have the 
additional property of measuring value, 
so for this reason we call any 2-by-2 table 
of prices corresponding to a given table of 
accounts the table of values. Market prices 
are at first glance just the quantity of money 
required to purchase a given resource on the 
market instead of using the money to buy 
some other thing. The opportunity cost, 
however, represents the value of the most 
valued forgone alternative, so market prices 
will not always correspond to the opportunity 
cost. 
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We now consider some of the different technical 
framings of EEHs, specifically: effectiveness 
studies; costing studies; cost-effectiveness 
studies; distributional cost-effectiveness 
studies; extended cost-effectiveness studies; 
benefit-cost analysis; cost-of-illness studies; 
and the investment case. 
EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES
The EEH on which all the others are built 
is the effectiveness study. An effectiveness 
study constitutes an evaluation of the logical 
framework, that is, it determines whether the 
inputs reliably produce the outcomes when 
combined as stipulated in the intervention. 
This kind of study is common in medicine 
and public health (e.g. in the form of trials), 
and so descriptive accuracy would recognize 
epidemiology as the framing discipline of the 
effectiveness study. Nonetheless, since all 
EEHs depend upon evidence of effectiveness, 
the effectiveness study is an essential 
building block for any economic evaluation. 
The “effectiveness study” relied upon in a 
given EEH may in fact involve the synthesis of 
evidence from multiple trials or other sources. 
Such synthesis, when required, is represented 
in the logical framework. Though we do not 
discuss evidence synthesis in more detail, this 
seems like a good place to remind readers 
that EEHs are inherently trans-disciplinary 
exercises, typically relying on, according 
to context and purpose, epidemiology, 
biostatistics, evidence review, economics, 
econometrics, dynamical modelling, and 
demography, as well as from political science, 
management science, and ethics. In view of 
their primacy, we label effectiveness studies 
as the level-0 EEH. 
EEHs display a nested structure in the 
sense that the different study types can be 
arranged in layers such that the outer rings 
require incrementally greater amounts of 
information, building on that contained in the 
inner studies. Our device of concentric rings 
involves a certain amount of simplification. 
That said, it is always applicable in the 
sense that, logically if not temporally, we 
need to start in the centre (i.e. we need to 
have on hand the required information 
from the effectiveness study). Once this 
information is established, the order of the 
other studies described in the outer rings 
can be somewhat arbitrary and ought not to 
be seen as rigidly linear. Indeed, if evidence 
from an appropriate effectiveness study is on 
hand, it can be possible to jump over certain 
rings directly to the more outward layers. 
There is, however, merit in emphasizing 
the nested structure: doing so not only 
provides an effective didactic device but also 
highlights the possibility (central, moreover, 
to our pluralistic approach) of presenting 
the same underlying set of information in 
various technical framings. In other words, 
we believe that a wisely constructed EEH 
can exploit the nested structure we describe 
so as to communicate the same results more 
effectively to different observers. See Figure 
2 for a picture of how different EEHs build 
outwards from the effectiveness study. 
3.  A FRAMEWORK FOR 
THINKING ABOUT ECONOMIC 
EVALUATIONS IN HEALTH
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0.	 	Effectiveness:	the quantity of health gains 
resulting from the intervention (validates the 
logical framework)
1.  Costs: The market value of the inputs required 
for the intervention
2.	 	Cost	effectiveness	analysis:	the quantity of 
health gains resulting from the intervention 
compared to the cost of the inputs
3.	 	Distributional	cost	effectiveness	anslysis:	
the quantity of health gains and their 
distributional characteristics, compared to the 
cost of the inputs
4.	 	Benefit-cost	analysis:	the value of the 
outcomes compared to the cost of the inputs
COSTING STUDIES
Costing studies are the level-1 EEH and 
merely associate prices to quantities identified 
in a prior effectiveness study. The common 
unit of account used in costing studies is 
market prices (Ps). To calculate costs ≡ Pinputs 
x Qinputs we multiply the unit price for each 
input by the number of units of input used 
and then sum across all inputs. If the market 
does its job well (more on this in Section 4), 
then costs represent the opportunity cost 
(see Table 1) of resources. Even if there are 
distortions, though, costs calculated using 
market prices are still (implicitly) understood 
by the practitioners of costing studies to be 
a useful estimator of economic opportunity 
cost. 
An example table of accounts for a costing 
study is shown in Table 3. 
Here we show non-market-valued costs as 
“not assessed in this example”, meaning that 
their absence is not a feature of costing studies 
per se but merely of this particular table of 
accounts. The omission of non-market-valued 
costs implies that the perspective of the 
table of accounts might be called financial. 
In practice, users of costing studies typically 
Figure 2: EEHs have a nested structure
Table 3: Generic table of accounts for a typical costing study in health 
Costs (Ps x Qs) Outcomes (Qs)




• Other market-traded costs
(not assessed)
Non-market-valued costs (not assessed in this example) (not assessed)
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care mainly about market-valued costs, but 
there is nothing in principle to discourage 
someone who is doing a costing study from 
counting non-market-valued costs, in which 
case the costing study might be said to have 
an economic or societal (or some other) 
perspective depending on what is considered 
important for the observer. However, as non-
market-traded inputs do not have market 
prices, estimates of their value (price) need 
to come from special calculations. We discuss 
such calculations in Section 4. 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
STUDIES
The next ring in the nest relates to cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA). An example of 
a generic table of accounts for CEA is shown 
in Table 4. The defining characteristic of 
a typical CEA is that it measures inputs in 
terms of a common unit of account (money) 
but measures outcomes as quantities (using 
either natural or constructed units). A 
separate point is that, at least for EEHs, health 
outcomes are usually the defining purpose of 
the intervention evaluated with a CEA. Thus, 
whether the upper-right cell (representing 
market-traded outcomes) is populated, and 
with what elements, is primarily a contextual 
consideration that depends on the purpose 
and audience of the study. There is no reason 
of principle why a CEA should not consider 
non-health consequences, and some do. That 
said, our narrative focuses on the kind of CEA 
that compares costs (whether market- or non-
market traded) to health outcomes. 
DISTRIBUTIONAL COST-
EFFECTIVENESS STUDY
The next level shows distributional cost-
effectiveness analysis (DCEA). A DCEA uses 
nearly the same table of accounts as a CEA but 
includes in addition at least one non-market-
traded outcome representing the distribution 
of health gains (see Table 5). The distribution 
of outcomes (and also of opportunities) 
is an ethical concern often referred to 
under the heading of equity, although the 
related concepts of justice, equality, and 
fairness are also germane. In contrast to 
classic utilitarianism, these distributional 
concepts all make some claim to the effect 
that differences between persons matter 
because people have different moral claims 
on resources [47]. Although the equality of 
outcomes can usually be measured in terms 
of the simple statistical dispersion of the 
outcome in the population of interest, equity, 
fairness, and justice each require, though 
potentially in different ways, more than a 
simple statistical measure; they require an 
account linking purely descriptive statistics 
Table 4: Generic table of accounts for a typical CEA in health 
Costs (Ps x Qs) Outcomes (Qs)






• Other market-traded costs
(for simplicity, not shown in this example)
Non-market-valued costs and 
non-market-traded outcomes
• Beneficiaries’ unpaid-work costs
• Other unpaid-work costs
•  Other non-market-traded input costs
• Increased years of life 
•  Increased health-related quality of life
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with some normative ethical account. Though 
DCEA has not so far elaborated a theory of 
equity, its leading practitioners do not tend to 
favour the use of raw equality metrics [48], 
preferring the decision-maker’s preferences 
about differing moral claims to be explicitly 
represented in terms of trade-offs between 
the distribution and the maximization of 
health. Thus, a typical DCEA converts health 
outcomes (measured in HALYs) into “equity-
equivalent health outcomes” (also measured 
in HALYs) by means of a rate of exchange 
determined by (some observer’s) preferences 
regarding health–equity trade-offs. The 
rate of exchange might come from social 
preferences if they are known, but the key 
objective of DCEA is to make such trade-offs 
explicit. Finally, insofar as DCEA requires an 
aggregation structure for valuing both the 
distribution and the maximization of health 




Extended cost-effectiveness analysis (ECEA) 
is, as its name implies, a study type measuring 
and reporting a potentially open-ended 
number of outcomes in addition to health and 
equity, such as financial risk protection, but 
also budget impact, acceptability to the target 
population, and feasibility (i.e. the probability 
of successful implementation). In contrast 
to DCEAs, however, the trend of practice in 
ECEAs is to report outcomes in disaggregated 
fashion, displaying them dashboard style, 
rather than using a common unit of account 
for the aggregation of quantities of interest in 
a single statistic. See Table 6. 
Table 5: Generic table of accounts for a typical DCEA in health (additions shown in bold type)
Costs (Ps x Qs) Outcomes (Qs)






• Other market-traded costs
(for simplicity, not shown in this example)
Non-market-valued costs and 
non-market-traded outcomes
(for simplicity, not shown in this example) • Increased years of life 
•  Increased health-related quality of life
•  Equity-equivalent healthy life 
years (positive or negative)
Table 6: Generic table of accounts for a typical ECEA in health (additions shown in bold typ)
Costs (Ps x Qs) Outcomes (Qs)






• Other market-traded costs
(for simplicity, not shown in this example)
Non-market-valued costs and 
non-market-traded outcomes
(for simplicity, not shown in this example) • Increased years of life 
• Increased health-related quality of life
•  Equity (usually shown indirectly by 
the	stratification	of	outcomes	by	
population covariates)
•  Financial risk protection (usually 
shown by cases of poverty averted) 
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AGGREGATION IN EEHS
ECEA poses an implicit question: If, as in 
costing studies and CEAs, we can measure 
the value of inputs using a common unit of 
account (money), then why not also measure 
the value of outcomes with a common unit? 
This question runs like a red thread through 
all the EEHs discussed here, with many 
of the decisions that appear to be about 
technical framing in fact representing an 
underlying ethical view about the benefits 
or disbenefits of aggregation. The typical 
CEA has already made a significant step in 
the direction of aggregation by measuring 
disparate health outcomes with a common 
unit such as HALYs. DCEA has made a 
further step in proposing to measure both 
the distribution and maximization of health 
with the same unit (e.g. equity-equivalent 
HALYs); similarly, it was initially proposed 
that ECEA would account for the money-
metric value of insurance among its outcomes 
[49], which is nothing other than a way of 
converting financial risk protection into 
income-equivalent dollars. So there is a clear 
tendency in EEHs to use a common unit of 
account. 
HALYs, equity-equivalent HALYs, and 
the money-metric value of financial risk 
protection all require special calculations 
to measure outcomes with a common unit 
of account. These calculations are not only 
technically challenging but are also often 
hard to explain to decision-makers or the 
public. The trouble they cause nevertheless 
brings several advantages, for example: 
1.  achieving informational compression 
for disparate outcome measures that 
are measured using distinct natural or 
constructed units.
As just mentioned, a common unit of account 
also opens up, at least in principle, the 
possibility of:
2.  measuring both inputs and outcomes 
using the same units.
Moreover, when the common unit of account 
for outcomes is monetary, then it provides the 
further possibility of: 
3.  aggregating market-traded outcomes (e.g. 
upper-right cell) with non-market-traded 
outcomes using prices. 
The latter point might be considered 
important when health interventions have 
important non-health outcomes, some of 
which are market traded. Moreover, many 
non-health interventions in public policy, such 
as changes in the money supply, frequently 
have market-traded non-health outcomes, 
such as increasing employment, as one of 
their defining purposes. So measuring non-
market-traded outcomes using prices not only 
allows for the inclusion of a larger scope of 
outcomes (some of which may be relevant for 
ethical reasons or because they have health 
consequences) but it also allows for the 
comparison of health interventions and non-
health interventions using the same metric. 
These considerations bring us naturally to the 
next study type. 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
Despite the similarities in their table of 
accounts, a BCA proposes to do something 
more than a CEA, which might otherwise 
count the very same kinds of inputs and 
outcomes. This extra something amounts to 
valuing all inputs and outcomes in terms of a 
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common unit of account, namely money. So 
here we introduce another term, one that is 
idiosyncratic to the BCA: when outcomes are 
valued in terms of money, a BCA calls them 
benefits ≡ Poutcomes x Qoutcomes. In this sense, 
specific to this particular study type, benefits 
estimate the value of outcomes. When other 
study types measure outcomes in terms of non-
monetary units, either natural or constructed, 
in technical discussions at any rate they are 
typically referred to simply as outcomes, 
outputs, impacts, or effects (hence the term 
cost-effectiveness). Others, for example, those 
who work on healthcare insurance packages, 
use “benefit” to describe the specific services 
to which a beneficiary is entitled. Howbeit, 
the defining characteristic of a BCA, and what 
distinguished it from a CEA of any of the kinds 
noted, is that a BCA measures all inputs and 
outcomes as monetary values. For brevity, 
we use the terms “monetary equivalents” 
or “monetised” to describe the valuations of 
non-market-traded outcomes so expressed. In 
principle, however, we might equally think in 
terms of using another non-monetary unit of 
account, including an intangible one, such as 
equity units or utils, or alternatively a tangible 
one, such as smartphone equivalents. The 
reasons why BCA invariably uses a monetary-
valuation strategy are explained in Section 4.
For the market-traded inputs and outcomes 
shown in the top row of Table 7, market prices 
can be used for valuation. For non-market-
traded inputs and outcomes, enumerated in 
the bottom row, non-market prices evidently 
need to be obtained. To distinguish non-
market prices from market ones, the former 
are called shadow prices by economists5. A 
shadow price is merely the term used to refer 
to an inferred price applied to a good that is 
not bought or sold in the market. By extension, 
the term shadow price refers also to adjusted 
prices for goods that are inaccurately priced 
in the market (more on this in Section 4). As 
we have noted, shadow prices can play a role 
in any EEH costing study; however, given the 
thoroughgoing use of monetary valuation 
in a BCA, shadow prices are a particularly 
important element required for this type of 
study. The table of accounts for a typical BCA 
in health is shown in Table 7. Table 7 differs 
from Table 4 for a CEA only in its uniform use 
of prices to express not only all inputs but also 
all outcomes as monetary values. 
5  Shadow price is technically the name for the solution value 
of a Langrangian multiplier in the theory of constrained 
optimization. By analogy, the term shadow price is 
commonly used in economics to refer to any non-market 
price estimated by any of a variety of means.
Table 7: Generic table of accounts for a typical BCA
Costs (Ps x Qs) Benefits	(Ps x Qs)










• Other market-valued benefits 




• Other non-market-traded costs
• Increased-years-of-life benefits
•  Increased health-related-quality-of-
life benefits
• Other non-market-valued benefits
18 HEALTH FINANCING WORKING PAPER NO 18
THE STATUS OF PRICES IN AN EEH
Market prices represent the cost, in financial 
terms, of purchasing the inputs required for 
the intervention. This is the minimal sense of 
monetized value that is required for a CEA. 
However, do market prices also represent 
something more meaningful, and if so under 
what conditions? Similarly, are the shadow 
prices required for an EEH and in particular 
for a BCA a socially meaningful measure of 
value? Before discussing these questions more 
in Section 4, we display the tables of account 
for several EEHs that are closely related to the 
BCA study, and we also make some general 
remarks. 
COST-OF-ILLNESS STUDIES
One such study is the cost-of-illness (COI) 
study. Although COI studies have mostly 
been superseded in contemporary evaluation 
research in health, they were popular in the 
post-war period and figured prominently in 
the ground-breaking work of Dorothy Rice 
and Selma Mushkin. At the time, EEHs did 
not form a distinct sub-field within evaluation 
science, nor were they sharply separated from 
the broader domains of economics. For these 
reasons COI studies are highly instructive 
today, since they reveal the kind of questions 
that captured the imagination of the public-
sector researchers and policy-makers who 
codified and applied EEHs in the decades 
following Rice and Mushkin. Moreover, COI 
studies have recently experienced something 
of a resurgence in global health, arguably 
related to the demoticization of EEHs, 
demonstrating that the concerns to which 
the original COI studies gave voice remain 
important, in particular for non-specialist 
audiences. 
A COI study purports to measure the economic 
consequences of illness. At the foundation of 
the methodology is a distinction between the 
direct costs of treatment, rehabilitation, or 
palliation and the indirect costs of outcomes 
that are the consequential effects of disease, 
such as reduced labour-force participation. 
In other words, if a disease might have 
been prevented, treated, or eliminated but 
no further action is taken (that is, beyond 
business as usual), then not only the costs 
of (baseline) treatment but also the forgone 
benefits that would have flowed from the 
(counterfactual) enhanced prevention, 
treatment, or elimination are counted as costs 
in a COI study. The causal story of a COI study 
is hence rather different from that of most 
EEHs. See Figure 3. 
What a COI study calls costs might in 
our conception of BCA be better termed 
disbenefits, meaning the negative 
consequences (outcomes) of not doing more, 
valued in monetary terms. In practice, the 
forgone consequential benefits counted in a 
Figure 3: The causal story of a COI study in schematic form
Disease Disbenefits“Business as Usual”
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COI study are invariably market valued, in 
particular the negative effects of illness on 
labour productivity and supply. A COI study 
in effect relabels monetary benefits that might 
have been achieved through the improved 
prevention, treatment, or elimination of 
disease as the indirect costs of doing nothing 
more than usual. The focus of the COI study 
is thus on the disease; in the COI study, 
the disease is the protagonist whereas the 
intervention is the protagonist of most other 
forms of EEH. The table of accounts for a 
typical COI study is shown in Table 8. The 
concept of disease-focused studies allows us 
also to make a broader comment. 
DISEASE-FOCUSED STUDIES
Disease-focused studies are usually considered 
relevant before undertaking intervention-
focused studies (at least in the sense that they 
are logically prior). Disease-focused studies 
are suitable for answering agenda-shaping 
questions (e.g. Is it worth spending billions 
of dollars in public money to discover a cure 
for Fields condition since, tragic though it is, 
there are only two people in the world with the 
disease?). Another common disease-focused 
study is the burden-of-disease (BOD) study. 
A BOD study measures only the non-market-
traded, negative outcomes of disease. Neither 
COI nor BOD alone indicate the potential 
benefit of interventions, though advocates 
sometimes use such studies to set research 
priorities or treatment priorities. Although, 
like the effectiveness study, a BOD study is 
not an EEH properly speaking, we show its 
table of accounts in Table 9. The COI study 
might be said to be similar in purpose to a 
BOD study; however, in terms of its focus on 
monetary valuation the COI study is a close 
methodological relative of the BCA study. 
Table 9: Generic table of accounts for a burden-of-disease study
Costs of doing nothing for the 
disease
Bad outcomes of the disease
Market-valued costs (not assessed) (not assessed)
Non-market-traded outcomes (not assessed) • Decreased years of life 
• Decreased health related quality of 
life 
Table 8: Generic table of accounts for a typical cost-of-illness study
Direct costs of business as usual Benefits	
Indirect (consequential) costs of 
business as usual




• Other market-traded costs
• Productivity costs
• Labour-supply costs
Non-market-valued costs (not assessed) (not assessed)
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THE INVESTMENT CASE IN 
HEALTH
Another hybrid EEH now popular in global 
health is the investment case. Although the 
term has been used in a number of senses, 
we restrict our attention to investment cases 
reporting a return-on-investment (ROI) 
statistic. Since this is one of the principal 
statistics usually calculated in a BCA, an 
investment case is therefore merely the 
name for a specific kind of BCA. A standard 
BCA is designed to determine whether any 
intervention (policy, plan, or project) is 
socially desirable, where social desirability 
is decided by an indicator function that 
compares some aggregate of benefits to costs 
(see Section 4 for more details). A typical 
investment case in health employs a table of 
accounts similar to that shown in Table 10. 
Here, and in contrast to a standard BCA, non-
market-valued benefits are usually restricted 
to health benefits, and non-market-valued 
inputs are frequently ignored [e.g. 50]. As 
in a COI study, moreover, the market-valued 
benefits counted in an investment case in 
health are usually restricted to labour-market-
mediated outcomes. 
CAUSAL INFERENCE IN EEHS
We claimed that a causal story lies at the heart 
of any EEH and that it is usually embodied in 
the effectiveness study. To recap, a simple way 
to understand any EEH is that it builds on the 
causal story by layering additional, specifically 
economic, information on to the structure 
of the effectiveness study. In another way, 
however, the effectiveness study is also key to 
understanding an EEH: the effectiveness study 
relies on one of the main methods of scientific 
enquiry, namely counterfactual analysis. 
Counterfactual analysis is based on the idea 
that cause C is a cause of event E if and only 
if E depends counterfactually on C; that is, if 
and only if C had not occurred, E would not 
have occurred [51]. An important technique 
in empirical analysis using the counterfactual 
approach is thus to isolate a state of the world 
in which C does not exist, and where E too 
can be reliably observed not to exist, while 
also isolating a state of the world in which 
C does exist and where E too can be reliably 
determined also to be present: when this can 
be done, the claim that C is the cause of E is 
held not to have been refuted. This strategy is 
at the heart of modern experimental design, 
and explains why pains are taken to isolate the 
control arm from the intervention arm, and 
thus to segregate intervention inputs within 
only the intervention arm of, say, a randomized 
controlled trial. Just as the effectiveness study 
establishes the conditions allowing for causal 
inference about the intervention, so must the 
EEH respect these same conditions if one is to 
make valid inferences about the corresponding 
economic facts. 
Table 10: Generic table of accounts for a typical ‘investment case’ in health 
Costs (Ps x Qs) Benefits	(Ps x Qs)






• Other market-traded costs
• Productivity benefits
• Labour-supply benefits
Non-market-valued costs and 
benefits
(not assessed in this example) • Increased-years-of-life benefits
•  Increased-health-related-quality of 
life benefits
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Investment cases in health sometimes include 
a quantity called “averted costs” as one of the 
benefits of intervention. Averted costs, which 
are also commonly called “cost offsets”, refer, 
for example, to the reduced costs required for 
the treatment of disease following a vaccination 
campaign. In our framework, healthcare 
costs incurred prior to the intervention are a 
feature of the baseline scenario. Clearly, the 
comparison on which an EEH relies depends 
on a strict logical separation between the 
baseline (e.g. actual or current) state of the 
world used for comparison purposes and the 
counterfactual (i.e. intervention) one. This is 
analogous to the separation maintained in a 
trial between the intervention and the control 
arms: just as in a trial, in an EEH we compare 
these two states of the world so as to measure 
the effect of the intervention. 
Isolating the intervention inputs and 
outcomes in only one of the states of the world 
is the key to making causal inferences about 
intervention effects. Nevertheless, in order 
to compare the baseline and intervention 
states of the world, we take the difference 
between the two, i.e. costs in the baseline (or 
comparator) scenario are subtracted from the 
costs, including those of the intervention, in 
the counterfactual scenario, and likewise the 
effects in the baseline are subtracted from 
intervention effects in the counterfactual. 
Baseline costs are then sometimes called 
“averted costs” and interpreted as a benefit. 
It should be clear however, that averted costs 
are not a benefit but rather a quantity that is 
subtracted from the costs of the intervention: 
averted costs are a debit on the input-side 
rather than a credit on the outcome-side of 
the balance sheet. This distinction is crucial 
for the implicit logical framework of an EEH. 
While subtracting baseline costs from 
intervention costs is a perfectly valid 
accounting procedure, there is another 
common use for averted costs that is not at 
all valid, either causally or in accounting 
terms. Averted costs are commonly used 
as a surrogate (i.e. as a shadow price) for 
intervention benefits in an investment case, as 
shown in Table 11. For example, the (market-
valued) costs of cancer treatment in the 
baseline might be used to estimate the market-
valued benefits of preventing the cancer due 
to an intervention. This usage, however, does 
not maintain a logical separation between 
the intervention and baseline scenarios and 
is thus illegitimate. It is therefore strongly 
deprecated. 
On the other hand, increases in the labour 
supply due to the prevention of the cancer are 
a benefit that is causally attributable to the 
intervention. Increases in the labour supply, for 
example, valued say at the average wage rate, 
are an unequivocal market-valued benefit. 
Likewise, to maintain the separation between 
states of the world that is necessary for causal 
inference, it is important not to subtract a 
market-valued benefit, such as the value of 
increased labour supply, from the costs of 
intervention. This point has become obscure, 
as it is perhaps understandably tempting to 
lump together inputs and outcomes that are 
all denominated in monetary units in the 
numerator of a cost-effectiveness ratio despite 
the fact that such confounding negates the 
basis of causal inference. 
In summary, it is important to distinguish 
conceptually between the two common 
uses of the term “averted costs” and not to 
be taken in by the fact that the same words 
are often employed in two distinct usages. 
The usage shown in Table 11 (we stress, 
not recommended) is discussed again in 
Section 4. 
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CEAS IN INVESTMENT-CASE CLOTHING
Sometimes the table of accounts used for an 
investment case in health would, if rendered 
explicit, look similar to that shown in Table 
12. This table of accounts is virtually identical 
to that of a typical CEA in health (i.e. one 
comparing market-valued costs to non-
market-valued health outcomes), except that 
here outcomes have been valued in monetary 
terms. One might well ask, what is the value 
added of such a study?
Since the price estimates for non-market-
valued outcomes, in particular for health 
outcomes, are subject to a number of 
principled objections (see Section 4), there 
would seem to be little purpose in dressing up 
a CEA as a diminished investment case of this 
kind. Indeed, doing so might be considered 
tantamount to polluting an accepted notion of 
health outcomes (e.g. HALYs) with a doubtful 
estimate of the shadow price of health gains 
(e.g. VSLY, or “value of a statistical life-year”). 
Consequently, this kind of investment case is 
also not recommended. An investment case 
should report at least some market-valued 
benefits in order to so qualify as such. 
So far, we have shown how our table 
of accounts can be used to lay out the 
landscape of economic evaluations in health 
in a systematic way. In the next section we 
consider how it helps to frame the discussion 
of a particular form of EEH, namely benefit-
cost analysis in health. 
Table 11: An augmented table of accounts for an alternative investment case (not recommended)
Costs of the intervention Benefits	of	the	intervention
Market-valued costs •  Intervention costs calculated in the 
usual way
•  Labour-market benefits calculated in 
the usual way
•  Averted healthcare costs (i.e.  
those from the upper-left-hand cell 
in Table 7)
Non-market-valued costs (not assessed) •  Health benefits calculated in the usual 
way
Table 12: A diminished table of accounts for an investment case in health (not recommended) 
Costs (Ps x Qs) Benefits	(Ps x Qs)
Market-valued costs and 
benefits
• Paid-work costs
• Equipment and machines costs
• Medicines and consumables costs
• Facilities costs
• Other market-traded costs
(not assessed in this example)
Non-market-valued costs and 
benefits
(not assessed in this example) • Increased years of life benefits
•  Increased health-related quality of life 
benefits
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In this section we discuss benefit-cost 
analysis (BCA). Our purpose is to offer an 
account of BCA that will be useful to those 
who use, commission and perform EEHs (in 
particular, “investment cases”) but who are 
not themselves specialists in the economics of 
BCA. Our account, however, is also intended 
to be a critique that will be of interest to BCA 
practitioners and welfare economists. 
4.1.  WELFARE ECONOMICS
INTRODUCTION
Benefit cost-analysis is a part of applied 
welfare economics insofar as it adopts an 
approach to measuring benefits that is 
conventionally termed “welfarist”. Though 
the welfarist approach has common points 
with the notion of perspective as discussed so 
far, it nevertheless differs from it in important 
ways. So to set the stage for BCA we need 
first to discuss welfare economics. Doing so 
has the side benefit of fleshing out a claim we 
made at the outset: that in the post-war period 
economic analysis became the predominant 
mode for the planning, management and 
evaluation of public social policy. 
The welfarist approach is concerned with 
counting and maximizing benefits enjoyed 
by individuals. But welfare economics 
goes further: it relates human well-being 
(equivalently as “welfare” or “utility”) to 
the behaviour of individuals, and therefore 
also relates the implications of market 
arrangements for human well-being. In its 
focus on the well-being of individuals, welfare 
economics responds to one of the chief 
concerns of enlightenment thought,6 and it has 
moreover been repeatedly recognized as an 
outstanding contribution to economic theory.7
In the theory of welfare economics, the value 
individuals assign to beneficial outcomes 
(“benefits”) is usually assumed to be 
determined by their preferences, although 
other accounts are possible [52]. Individuals’ 
preferences are required by the theory to 
obey certain rules, termed rational [52]. 
When preferences follow such rules and 
when, in addition, specific market conditions 
(described below) apply, it is possible to draw 
precise conclusions about the desirability of 
social policies. Koopmans put it like this: 
The idea that perfect competition in some 
sense achieves efficiency in the maximization 
of individual satisfactions runs through the 
whole of classical and neoclassical economic 
literature. At the time when utility was 
thought of as both measurable and comparable 
between different individuals this idea was 
expressed by attributing to perfect competition 
the property of maximizing the sum of the 
6  In giving precedence to the satisfaction of the individual, 
regardless of social station, classical economics and in 
particular classical welfare economics implicitly answers one 
of the criticisms voiced by the Abbé Sieyès (1789) in Qu’est-ce 
que le Tiers-Etat: “The desire for wealth seems to make 
all the states of Europe into nothing other than immense 
workshops. … We are thus compelled to regard the greater 
part of humanity as nothing other than work machines”. In 
welfare economics, on the other hand, human beings are 
ends, not means (cf. Immanuel Kant, Was ist Aufklärung?).
7  The Nobel Prize Committee has recognized contributions to 
welfare economics on 6 out of the 50 occasions that a prize 
in economics has been awarded; these awards account for 7 
out of 81 Nobel laureates in economics: Sen (1998), Mirrlees 
(1996), Allais (1988), Debreu (1983), Koopmans (1975), Hicks 
(1972), Arrow (1972).
4.  A DETAILED LOOK AT 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
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utilities of all consumers. This view could 
not be maintained after interpersonal utility 
comparisons were questioned. However, Pareto 
introduced a conceptual refinement that saved 
the proposition. He suggested that competition 
brought about a state in comparison to which 
no consumer’s satisfaction can be made higher, 
within the limitations of available resources and 
technological know-how, without at the same 
time lowering at least one other consumer’s 
satisfaction level [53].
The Paretian approach highlighted by 
Koopmans brings out a peculiar aspect of the 
economic theory of efficiency: efficiency is 
apparently desirable not only in the sense of 
the maximization of desirable outcomes (i.e. 
the usual meaning of efficiency) but also in 
the sense that it does not necessarily require 
the levelling down of anyone’s well-being. 
This particular aspect of the economic concept 
of efficiency is termed “Pareto optimality”, 
or “Pareto efficiency”. Arrow had this to say 
about it [10]: 
Both the conditions of this optimality and 
the definition of optimality call for comment. 
A definition is just a definition, but when the 
definiendum is a word already in common use 
with highly favorable connotations, it is clear 
that we are really trying to be persuasive; we 
are implicitly recommending the achievement 
of optimal states.
DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING: 
EFFICIENCY, OPTIMALITY AND LIBERTY 
The theory of neoclassical welfare economics 
developed in the post-war period offered 
a theoretically rich and mathematically 
rigorous account of Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand”, which is to say the idea that the 
decentralized and uncoordinated actions of 
independent agents result in a state of social 
organization where benefits are maximized, 
where each individual can pursue her well-
being according to the means available to her 
and, importantly, in which the state respects 
the individual’s autonomy. 
This theory came in the form of a number of 
a number of linked results on the equilibrium 
of competitive markets, results that remain 
a reference point for nearly all technocratic 
forms of economic analysis. That said, we 
refer here only to the main theory bearing on 
welfare economics [54, 55, 56]. Prior to these 
contributions, the “new welfare economics”8 
of the pre-war period relied on similar 
ideas but lacked a rigorous mathematical 
demonstration. Arrow, Debreu, and others 
gave welfare economics its mathematical 
foundation9 and in so doing firmly established 
its technical basis. However, they first had to 
“save the proposition” that markets were both 
efficient (in the usual sense) and optimal (in 
the Paretian sense). Although, previously, the 
notion of optimality had relied on explicit 
comparisons of well-being across persons, 
growing scepticism about the scientific basis 
for such comparisons, based on criticisms 
elaborated by economists such as Friedrich 
Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Lionel Robbins, 
required a response. The chief counter-move 
available in this debate was for welfare 
economics to adopt henceforth the optimality 
concept of Pareto [53, 54], which is to say, to 
abandon the vision of optimality previously 
embraced. 
In the pre-war form, proposed for example 
by Bergson [57] and Samuelson [58], welfare 
8  Considered to originate in the work of Bergson, Hicks, 
Hotelling, Kaldor, Lange, Lerner, Samuelson, and Taylor, who 
expanded on earlier work by Edgeworth, Marshall, Pareto, 
Pigou, and Sidgwick.
9  Adopting contemporary advances made by George Dantzig 
and John von Neuman that were an integral part of the 
post-war efflorescence of management science.
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economics assumed that transfers from the 
wealthy to the poor could be social welfare 
enhancing provided the rich were not 
ultimately made poorer than the poor. The 
basis for this was the diminishing marginal 
utility of income, and the use, either implicit 
or explicit, of a utilitarian (i.e. additive in 
utilities) social welfare function. This concept 
was referred to as the Pigou-Dalton principle 
[47]. The pre-war welfare economists believed 
that interpersonal well-being comparisons 
such as those required for the Pigou–Dalton 
principle were an essential part of their 
theory. Although as noted above that idea had 
been under attack since the beginning of the 
century, the most damaging blow was in the 
end struck by Arrow in the form of his 1951 
impossibility theorem [59]. 
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS AND 
ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
In summary, the battle lines were thus 
drawn: (i) interpersonal comparisons involve 
value judgements; (ii) value judgements 
are unscientific because they rely on an 
objective theory of the good10; and (iii) “such 
a philosophy could be and was used to justify 
government by elite, secular or religious” 
[59]. So to avoid the trap of inadvertently 
falling into totalitarianism through helping 
the poor, many economists felt obliged to 
eschew judgements about whose well-being 
matters more, such as that contained in the 
proposition that the poor benefit more from 
an additional $100 than the rich suffer from 
its removal. Arrow showed in effect that, in 
order to achieve this kind of value neutrality, 
a social welfare function needed to respect 
certain conditions. In the impossibility 
10  In Arrow’s words, “an objective social good defined 
independently of individual desires”; in contemporary ethics 
such theories are referred to as “objective list theories” (cf. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/) or “objective 
good theories” [52].
theorem, moreover, Arrow made what is 
the most influential claim about what those 
conditions are. Somewhat unexpectedly 
perhaps, in doing so Arrow showed that 
no social welfare function respecting his 
mooted conditions could be both rational 
and scientifically neutral in the sense of not 
requiring “value judgements”. 
What is not widely appreciated, however, is 
that, in excluding interpersonal comparisons 
of well-being like those required for the 
Pigou–Dalton principle, the third condition 
of Arrow’s impossibility theorem also rules 
out intrapersonal comparisons of differences 
in well-being [52]. This has the perverse 
result of ensuring that any social welfare 
function satisfying Arrow’s conditions is 
absolutely insensitive to the difference 
between happiness and misery for any given 
individual. Presumably Arrow did not think 
of intrapersonal comparisons of differences in 
well-being, such as those between happiness 
and misery, as being unreasonable or 
unscientific per se; even Wittgenstein, highly 
sceptical regarding the possibility of knowing 
the independent nature of reality, nevertheless 
maintained that an individual herself was 
the truest judge of her well-being.11 Indeed, 
in the case of Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
the third condition, obviating intrapersonal 
comparisons of well-being differences, was 
necessary not for the sake of value neutrality, 
but rather to ensure rationality: that is, so as 
not to fall into a so-called “voting paradox”. 
A voting paradox can arise if, as in some 
voting systems, weights are assigned to each 
place on the ballot. If a candidate withdraws 
from the race after votes are cast, using the 
11  “The world of the happy man is a different one from 
the world of the unhappy man.” (Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus 6.43)
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weights previously defined to rank outcomes 
can produce a result which is demonstrably 
less preferred by everyone [59] than one of 
the remaining alternatives. This possibility 
was forestalled by Arrow’s third condition: 
the “independence of irrelevant alternatives”, 
which limits preferences to rank orderings. 
Other fixes to the voting paradox might have 
been possible, such as re-calibrating the 
weights, but in removing the notion of weights 
from the social welfare function altogether 
Arrow chose a solution that could not be 
subject to the charge of post hoc tinkering. 
While Arrow’s third condition preserves rank 
information from preferences, nothing at all 
is preserved about differences in the level of 
satisfaction. 
Consequently Arrow’s third condition is far 
more agnostic about well-being than the 
kind of agnosticism implied by the mere 
denial of the possibility of interpersonal well-
being comparisons, such as in the subjective 
theory of value. As claimed above, Arrow’s 
third condition is akin to claiming that the 
difference between an individual’s happiness 
and misery – however critical that may seem 
to be for philosophy and in particular for 
ethics – was simply not a relevant fact for 
public policy decisions based on a rational 
concept of social welfare [52] (see Figure 4). 
Arrow acknowledged that the third condition 
represented a “value judgement”, but it was 
a value judgement he evidently felt to be 
entirely warranted [59]. 
It may ultimately be shown to be the fact of 
the matter that individuals are themselves 
incapable of telling the difference between a 
life of happiness and one of misery, but given 
the strong intuitions we seem to hold about 
the criticality of such differences for moral 
reasoning (cf. Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion), 
it is extremely striking to discover that these 










Let’s assume omniscience 
for the moment about 
individuals’ true underlying
cardinal utility (see ruler).
Here are two preference
profiles for the same 
Individual.
From Arrow’s third condition,
these profiles are exactly the same.
There’s thus no difference between 
these policies for social welfare in an 
Arrow compliant Social Welfare Function.
This means that differences in 
intrapersonal well-being levels, 
such as the difference between 
happiness and misery, are excluded





The minimal level of 
well-being required for 
life to be worth living
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intuitions must apparently be abandoned by 
any rational scientific framework for social 
policy. This fact captures well some of the 
current disappointment experienced with 
technocratic approaches to social policy: 
technocratic approaches seem to many 
ordinary people to nullify in one fell swoop 
entire domains of things they care about. 
Whether this frustration is an intrinsic part of 
technocracy or rather merely a feature of its 
post-war form is a question we may explore 
subsequently.
THE POST-WAR CONTEXT FOR 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 
Faced with the trio of results on efficiency, 
optimality and impossibility, welfare 
economics needed to be reconceptualized 
as soon as it was formulated in a more 
rigorous mathematical expression. The 
principal move was to embrace the concept 
of Pareto optimality, already discussed. An 
additional defence was to revive the concept 
(originating with Kaldor but supported and 
extended by Hicks) [60, p. 48], of “potential 
Pareto improvements”. Potential Pareto 
improvements sidestepped altogether the 
need to decide whose well-being matters 
more: the policy-maker can focus purely on 
efficiency, either by ignoring distributional 
concerns or by (and presumably this was the 
idea) passing the buck to a higher authority. 
The reluctance to make interpersonal 
well-being comparisons has been being 
re-evaluated recently [47, 52]. Yet, at the 
time, these results on efficiency, optimality 
and impossibility must have appeared to 
many economists not only to constitute a 
robust theory but also perhaps to be the best 
kind of defence against the statist coercion to 
which liberal economics claimed to provide 
an alternative. Modern public economics 
takes its starting point with the two results 
on efficiency and optimality [61, 62]. We shall 
see below how BCA became an answer to the 
third one [52]. 
THE FEATURES OF MARKET 
OUTCOMES
We now summarize the main results of 
neoclassical economics and show their 
relationship to the field of health economics. 
Markets are efficient and optimal – first 
fundamental theorem
A Pareto optimum is a distribution of goods 
such that no one in the economy can be made 
better off without making at least one other 
person worse off. Pareto optimality implies 
that all private win–win trades have been 
made, so we can imagine that the economy 
is at an equilibrium and that if trades are still 
continuing they are conducted at equilibrium 
rates. For example, at a Pareto optimum 
individuals have sold or are selling as much 
of their labour, at equilibrium wage rates, as 
they wish to in order to maximize their well-
being. The principle of liberty suggests that 
no further intervention is warranted since at 
least one person will be made to suffer and 
the state should not make choices that involve 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This 
equilibrium, and the prices that determine it, 
is called Pareto optimal. The first theorem of 
welfare economics says that any competitive 
equilibrium, that is, a market outcome 
resulting from perfect competition, is a Pareto 
optimum. 
Redistribution can be as good as markets 
– second fundamental theorem
Although a competitive equilibrium may be 
Pareto optimal, its distributional features 
might still be undesirable. This is not far-
fetched since extremely unequal distributions 
can still be Pareto optimal. As the post-
war version of welfare economics had 
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nothing to say about distribution, the (non-
economic) value judgements determining 
more socially desirable distributions needed 
to be introduced by the policy-maker, or by 
a higher authority, deus ex machina. The 
second theorem of welfare economics says 
that any desired Pareto-optimal distribution 
can be achieved by changing prices through 
a set of taxes and transfers, and that the 
new Pareto optimum so achieved will also 
correspond to a competitive equilibrium. 
Alternatively, for any distribution of income or 
wealth there is a competitive Pareto-optimal 
equilibrium. In this way the door was opened 
for redistributive social policies. We now turn 
to BCA, which was the main tool available for 
evaluating the desirability of such policies.
Potential Pareto improvements –  
response to the third fundamental  
theorem on impossibility
The two fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics form the bedrock of BCA. However, 
BCA goes one necessary step further: it claims 
that changes in which there are winners and 
losers are permissible if they allow for a greater 
sum total of benefits. This principle (known 
as the Kaldor–Hicks condition) implies that it 
is acceptable for there to be losers who are 
made worse off for the sake of providing public 
goods, fixing market failures, or pursuing 
other policies that improve benefits overall: 
in other words, redistributive policies should 
be implemented if it can be shown that they 
satisfy the Kaldor–Hicks condition. The use of 
Kaldor–Hicks condition solves the problem of 
choosing whose welfare matters: losers are 
acceptable if the sum of gains can potentially 
compensate the losers’ losses. Yet Kaldor–
Hicks leaves open the question of how or 
when compensation will be made, a question 
beyond the scope of welfare economics. As 
the Kaldor–Hicks condition is fulfilled when 
the sum of benefits and disbenefits due to 
the policy is greater than the sum of its costs, 
BCA concludes that a policy is desirable if its 
benefit-cost ratio is greater than 1. This is 
the indicator function referred to in Section 
3. In using this approach, a rational theory 
of technocratic social choice could remain 
agnostic about questions of distribution. 
The neoliberal state in  
neoclassical economics
In the neoliberal concept, the state 
nevertheless retains a key role [55]: to enforce 
private exchangeable property rights, provide 
public goods, regulate monopolies, reduce 
barriers to trade, and repair market failures. 
Moreover, the best policy tool for financing 
state functions was, in the light of the first and 
second fundamental theorems, understood 
at the time [55, 59] to be the direct taxation 
of income or wealth (in contrast to indirect 
taxation in the form of excises on goods and 
tariffs on trade, the forms of public-sector 
finance thitherto predominant). These results, 
expressed in arcane technical language, 
provided a foundation story for the priestly 
class of post-war social liberalism12 [61], which 
can be summarized as the idea that state-
directed public policy (subject to agnosticism 
about whether and how redistribution should 
be effected) can and should co-exist within 
an economy based primarily on individual 
liberty, private property and the action of free 
markets. 
THE POST-WAR CONTEXT AND THE  
BIRTH OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
Early economists writing about health and 
healthcare took these neoliberal principles for 
granted, sometimes more-or-less uncritically 
[7] but in other cases [5, 10] as a jumping-off 
point for noting differences in the conditions 
12 Also called neoliberalism or modern liberalism.
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of healthcare markets compared with the 
assumptions required by welfare economics. 
Subsequent health economists have tended 
to move even further beyond the welfarist 
framing, espousing a view that came to be 
termed extra-welfarism [63, 64]. Health 
economics thus formed an important early 
counterexample to the monolithic vision of 
social choice in neoliberal economics. 
Although the questions investigated in health 
economics are similar to those of welfare 
economics (e.g. is policy A superior to 
policy B?), contemporary health economists 
are sceptical about several points: (i) that 
individual preferences are an adequate 
basis for social choice in health affairs, (ii) 
that individual choices in healthcare obey 
the rules of rationality, and (iii) that the 
market conditions required by the welfare 
theorems apply [65]. To get around these 
objections, health economists favour the 
use of cost-effectiveness analysis in one of 
its guises (CEA, DCEA, ECEA). Moreover, 
health economists also tend to eschew grand 
theories of governance for the public weal. 
Recently, though, the use of BCA in health has 
been making a resurgence. In the following, 
we discuss the merits and demerits of BCA as 
compared to other forms of EEHs. 
4.2.  DIFFERING ACCOUNTS OF 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem revealed the 
difficulty of rational social choice in the 
absence of well-being comparisons; it did not, 
however, obviate the need for making choices. 
BCA represented a pragmatic approach to 
decision-making that, with the Kaldor–Hicks 
condition, could be used while debates about 
distribution continued. BCA has, moreover, 
a number of congenial features: it counts 
individual benefits, consistent with one of the 
founding views of enlightenment thought; 
it takes its bearings from the decentralized 
action of markets, borrowing strength 
thereby from the sophisticated mathematics 
of general equilibrium theory; furthermore, 
in allowing for intrapersonal comparisons 
of well-being levels, it violates Arrow’s third 
condition in the least controversial way [52]. 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem questioned 
whether any programme of rational social 
choice could be pursued. One of the defining 
features of rationality was that a transitive 
ordering of social welfare should be possible 
under alternative policies, and in common 
with other forms of consequentialist thought, 
BCA could not abandon transitivity. In order 
to maintain transitivity, BCA needed to 
engineer a set of enabling assumptions [66, p. 
37]. According to an authoritative reference 
guide to BCA, these assumptions are the 
following: 
i)  that individuals’ demand for goods is 
linear in income,
ii)  that individuals’ demand curves all have 
the same slope, 
iii)  that there is a unique set of prices faced by 
all individuals, and 
iv)  that individuals can resell any of the 
benefits resulting from policy. 
The latter two assumptions (iii, iv) concern 
the nature of markets. The former (i, ii) 
concern the admissible forms of preference 
satisfaction on the part of individuals (i) and 
society (ii). 
As noted elsewhere [47], BCA is more 
concerned with pragmatic choices than 
grand theory. We argue that, while the two 
assumptions regarding preferences (i, ii) 
are generally acknowledged as a necessary 
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kludge [67] without a basis in fact, the 
two assumptions about markets (iii, iv) are 
generally believed to be “true enough” in 
practice. Differing accounts of BCA exist, 
though. When framed in terms of the first two 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics, 
we term it “macro” BCA; an example is the 
theory-driven approach of neoclassical public 
economics [61, 62]. Other accounts posit 
a more modest foundation, one we term 
“micro” BCA. In the latter, the fundamental 
theorems are not mentioned and the 
optimality of competitive equilibrium is not 
directly appealed to. In the micro account, 
Pareto optimality and general-equilibrium 
theory are vestigial by design; welfare has 
been replaced by monetary equivalents as 
the coin of the realm. Accordingly, the basic 
building block of micro BCA is the concept 
of “willingness-to-pay” (WTP). Examples of 
micro BCA are presented in [47, 66, 68, and 
69]. 
Our view is that the micro version relies 
implicitly on the macro account but without 
acknowledgement. To show this, we describe 
what we call the two implicit assumptions of 
BCA. These implicit assumptions are merely 
a reformulation and more precise expression 
of the four conditions mentioned in the micro 
account presented in [66]. At the risk of 
some confusion, we name (iii) and (iv) the 
“first implicit assumption” and (i) and (ii) the 
“second implicit assumption”, in reverse of 
the order presented in [66]. 
THE FIRST IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION 
OF BCA – PERFECT AND COMPLETE 
MARKETS
There is a unique set of prices faced by 
all individuals (iii), and individuals can 
resell the benefits resulting from policies 
(iv). Proposition (iii) is equivalent to the 
assumption of perfect competition, and (iv), 
to the assumption of complete markets. The 
first implicit assumption of BCA is therefore 
Figure 5: A pictorial representation of price (a/b) as a slope at a tangent point
All other goods (usually measured in $)
A point of the utility (respectively, production) function: we are here
This line represents the slope of the utility (respectively, production) function at that point
ab
Indifference curve of the utility function (respectively, production possibilities frontier)
good X
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that markets are both perfect and complete. 
General equilibrium theory shows that the 
market price of a resource (e.g. of good X) 
under perfect competition is the same for all 
consumers and producers. See Figure 5. In 
the figure, the slope of the curve at the point 
(b, a) shows the rate (a/b) at which someone 
with this utility (respectively, production) 
function will trade X for other goods. Under 
a competitive equilibrium the (relative) 
market price is the same for each individual 
agent as the internal price (marginal rate of 
substitution) implied by the individual agent’s 
utility (respectively, production) function. 
However, only when markets are complete 
(iv) can individuals resell the benefits of 
policies. When markets are perfect, such 
benefits can be sold at a unique set of prices. 
Take again the example of leisure: if markets 
are complete and perfect, then individuals 
can sell as much or as little of their disposable 
time as they wish, and they will sell up to 
but not beyond the point where the internal 
value of leisure equals the external value 
of labour. In this case not only the prices 
of market-traded goods (e.g. labour) but 
also those of non-market-traded goods (e.g. 
leisure) are unique, ubiquitous and reflect 
only the aggregate constraints of technology, 
resources and preferences. This can be stated 
in another way: when agents face perfect 
and complete markets their consumption and 
production decisions are separable. 
Separability is equivalent to the 
decentralization of decision-making, and is 
held to be one of the chief benefits of perfect 
and complete markets. The economist Irving 
Fisher showed that, under these conditions, 
firms make production and investment 
decisions that are independent of the 
consumption decisions of their shareholders 
(in other words, in the case that the firm’s 
shareholders happen also to be the firm’s 
managers, the managers have no economic 
incentive to take actions that would inflate 
the firm’s share price merely for their personal 
benefit as shareholders; rather, and without any 
external control, the managers will rationally 
make decisions to maximize the firm’s long-
run profits). Under these same conditions, 
moreover, the members of households and 
individuals also make separable decisions 
as consumers of market and non-market 
goods, on the one hand, and as producers 
(e.g. sellers of labour), on the other. Unless 
markets are perfect and complete, individuals 
can face internal prices (opportunity costs) 
for non-market goods such as leisure that 
are not the same as the prevailing wage rate. 
So the first implicit assumption of BCA also 
amounts to an assumption of the separability 
of consumption and production decisions on 
the part of economic agents. 
THE SECOND IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION 
OF BCA – MONETARY-EQUIVALENT 
UTILITARIAN SOCIAL WELFARE
Individuals’ demand for goods is linear in 
income (i), and all individuals’ demand 
curves have the same slope (ii). We call this 
the second implicit assumption since although 
it is technically necessary for BCA it is not 
believed to be true. In other words, the second 
implicit assumption states the requirements 
that are necessary for the implicit social 
welfare function of BCA to be rational. The 
social welfare function particular to BCA 
might be called a monetary-equivalent 
utilitarian social welfare function: it requires 
that monetary equivalents (measures of 
WTP) be calculated for all goods affected by 
the policy and then added together for all 
the individuals who stand to lose or benefit. 
Practitioners of BCA readily acknowledge 
that in making these two claims BCA’s social 
welfare function is both unrealistic and 
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regressive. Nevertheless, they consider that it 
represents both a reasonable approximation 
and an acceptable value judgment (some do 
not consider value judgments to be entailed 
at all) [70] for the purposes of promoting the 
objective of efficiency [cf. 67]. 
4.3.  BENEFIT-COST  
ANALYSIS IN PRACTICE
So far we have discussed the theory of 
BCA. The bulk of its methods, on the other 
hand, amount to ad-hoc fixes for the sake of 
estimating monetary equivalents (WTP) in 
cases where the first assumption required 
by the theory does not hold, i.e. where 
market prices do not reflect opportunity cost. 
Elsewhere, market prices are tacitly assumed 
in BCA to represent the monetary equivalent 
of opportunity cost. Even in such cases as 
market failure and monopoly, however, prices 
are still assumed to respond to the rational 
expectations of supply and demand, so there 
is an assumption that economic methods of 
demand- and supply-curve inference can be 
used to estimate surplus value, as well as to 
estimate the effect of market-shifting changes 
in the supply or demand of goods, as well 
as for those of goods in secondary markets. 
The “economy-wide effects” of policies on all 
markets together are sometimes estimated 
using a computed general equilibrium 
model.13 In all of these cases observed 
market prices are filtered, or adjusted, with 
the aim of representing opportunity costs 
more accurately. Such adjusted prices are 
conventionally called shadow prices.
A range of strategies is also employed for 
estimating the opportunity cost (shadow 
13  Not to be confused with the general theory of competitive 
equilibrium previously discussed.
price) of non-market goods, i.e. goods for 
which no market price is available as a 
starting point. The simplest methods for 
the shadow-price estimation for non-market 
goods are based on like-for-like accounting 
principles, and have been widely used in 
EEHs since the days of Rice and Mushkin. 
Like-for-like comparisons mean comparisons 
in which irrelevant differences (for example, 
in changing denominators) have been 
controlled for so that similar things can be 
appropriately compared. According to the 
like-for-like principle, the shadow price of a 
non-market-traded good (like home-making) 
can usually be estimated by the market price 
of a relevantly similar market-traded good 
(like domestic services). It turns out that this 
like-for-like principle can be applied in at least 
two distinct ways, described below using the 
device of our table of accounts. 
FIRST APPROACH – TRANSPOSE OVER 
One like-for-like comparison used to estimate 
the shadow prices of non-market goods looks 
at the market prices of inputs to estimate 
the market prices of similar (counterfactual) 
outcomes. Transposing prices from inputs to 
outcomes means in effect copying prices from 
items in the left-hand column of the table of 
accounts and pasting them onto relevantly 
similar items in the right-hand column. See 
Figure 6. Such outcomes are “non-market-
traded goods” here because they have not 
been realized prior to the intervention and 
thus represent merely hypothetical goods. Yet, 
when markets exist for a relevantly similar 
input, according to the like-for-like principle 
the input prices can be used to value, ex ante, 
the corresponding counterfactual outcomes. 
For example, a BCA in health might employ 
the market prices of paid work (wage rates of 
labour) in order to estimate the shadow price 
of increases in the labour supply or in labour 
productivity attributable to the intervention. 
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Another example of left-to-right transposition 
uses the market value of averted healthcare 
costs (inputs in the baseline scenario) to 
estimate the shadow price of non-market-
traded health gains resulting from the 
(counterfactual) prevention, treatment, or 
rehabilitation of the condition. This procedure 
was previously discussed in Section 3, where 
it was noted that it violates the logical 
separation of the baseline and intervention 
scenarios. We are now see an additional 
defect of this method: it implicitly claims (but 
without justification) that the shadow price 
of non-market-traded health gains can be 
represented by the indirect costs of forgone 
labour-market outcomes, such as lost work. 
In effect this procedure represents a double 
transposition – transpose over and then down. 
It is doubly not to be recommended.
SECOND APPROACH – TRANSPOSE 
DOWN 
Downward transposition is not in every 
case illegitimate and another like-for-like 
comparison that is used to infer the shadow 
prices of non-market outcomes takes the 
market prices of market-traded inputs or 
outcomes in order to estimate the shadow 
prices of generically similar goods that are 
not market traded. Transposing prices from 
market-traded to non-market-traded goods 
means copying them from items in the upper 
row of the table of accounts and pasting them 
onto relevantly similar items in the lower row. 
See Figure 7. For example, a BCA in health 
might stipulate that unpaid work (volunteer 
labour or travel time) can be valued using 
(some function of) the market wage rate. 
Figure 6: Pricing outcomes based on similar inputs
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THIRD APPROACH – PREFERENCE 
MEASUREMENT
If market prices are not available as a starting 
point, then monetary equivalents can be 
estimated de novo by means of revealed- or 
stated-preference studies. This approach 
is equivalent to eliciting the aggregate 
demand or supply curve structure directly 
from individual preference measurements. 
Reliance on revealed- or stated-preference 
studies is a critical feature of almost all BCAs 
done in health, for which one of the main 
outcomes is a non-market-traded good (i.e. 
improved health). 
The first (over) and second (down) approaches 
to shadow pricing rely substantively on the 
first implicit assumption of BCA (complete and 
perfect markets). The first implicit assumption 
justifies the use of market prices for the 
estimation of the opportunity cost of relevantly 
similar non-market-traded goods. The third 
approach, however, takes the first implicit 
assumption of complete and perfect markets 
merely as a theoretical reference point and 
attempts to mimic, through the application of 
economic theory, the conditions that would 
pertain were the assumption to hold in practice. 
Revealed- and stated-preference  
estimates of WTP
The direct estimation of WTP values using 
revealed- or stated-preference studies relies 
not only on the first implicit assumption of 
BCA (i.e. perfect markets); WTP studies also 
rely on the second implicit assumption of 
BCA (a monetary-equivalent utilitarian social 
welfare function [66, p. 37]). Without these 
assumptions (i, ii, and iii, above), WTP values 
derived from revealed- or stated-preference 
studies have questionable economic meaning. 
As the name implies, stated-preference 
studies ask individuals about hypothetical 
trade-offs that they would in principle be 
willing to make; on the other hand, revealed-
preference studies rely on the observed 
features of incomplete markets, or on the 
collective behaviour of individuals, from 
which information about the aggregate rates 
of trade-off between market-valued and non-
market-valued goods can be inferred. 
In stated-preference studies individuals are 
asked to make hypothetical trade-offs in 
isolation from the actions of other economic 
agents. In the absence of assumptions (i), 
(ii), and (iii), the data emerging from stated-
preference studies can be construed only 
as constituting potential bids. As such bids 
have not been subjected to the discipline of 
the market, although reflecting individual 
preferences they do not and cannot have 
any further economic significance unless (i) 
individuals’ demand functions are linear in 
income, (ii) individuals demand functions 
have the same slope, and (iii) individuals’ 
hypothetical bids (when averaged in some 
fashion) represent the market price that 
would arise through perfect competition. 
In revealed-preference studies, on the other 
hand, some form of collective market forces 
can be presumed to act, for example when 
estimates are made of the consumption 
value of small reductions in mortality risk 
by looking at wage differentials according to 
occupation (conventionally called the “value 
of a statistical life”, or VSL). However, in 
order for estimates from revealed-preference 
studies of wage differentials to have the force 
of prices from a competitive equilibrium, it 
must be assumed that (at least on average and 
in aggregate) individuals possess complete 
information about occupational risks, that in 
making labour-market decisions they act in 
accordance with the principles of expected 
utility theory, that they do so independently 
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of their consumption decisions, and that they 
are unconstrained by, for example, the market 
power of employers. 
These assumptions are demonstrably false. 
But that is not the main problem with WTP 
measures from either revealed- or stated-
preference studies. The main problem 
with WTP measures is that they cannot be 
aggregated while preserving transitivity in 
BCA valuations unless the second implicit 
assumption of BCA (the monetary equivalent 
utilitarian social welfare) is substantively 
true. Unless, that is, individuals’ demand 
for goods is linear in income and unless 
individuals’ demand curves have the same 
slope, aggregate measures of WTP do not 
respect the principle of transitivity required 
to preserve rationality in the commonly used 
sense.
For a BCA done in health, the most important 
measure of WTP is arguably that required to 
measure reductions in mortality or morbidity 
risk occurring as a result of the intervention. 
Revealed- or stated-preference estimates of 
the shadow price of health-risk reductions 
depend on either the first implicit assumption 
of BCA, or on both assumptions. Failing these 
conditions, the estimates of WTP derived 
from revealed- or stated-preference estimates 
are not socially meaningful (in the sense of 
the second implicit assumption) and cannot 
be aggregated into transitive benefit-cost 
valuations (in the sense of the first implicit 
assumption). It so happens that if either 
implicit assumption of BCA is false then both 
revealed- and stated-preference studies yield 
estimates of WTP that are not economically 
meaningful (because they represent a 
biased estimate of opportunity cost) or are 
not rational (because they do not preserve 
transitivity). 
The most serious objection for  
the use of BCA in health
Thus, the most serious objection to the 
use of BCA in health arises with respect to 
its estimates of monetary equivalents. It 
either produces estimates which are biased 
estimates of opportunity cost (in first two 
approaches, over and down) or estimates 
that are doubtful as estimates of opportunity 
cost and in addition are non-transitive (with 
stated- and revealed-preference approaches). 
This is important since BCA is often presented 
as an approach which, although costly and 
time-consuming to implement, is nevertheless 
the gold standard for EEH. On the contrary, it 
is important to understand that BCA contains 
its own internal contradictions, that there are 
multiple ways of implementing BCA which 
are not theoretically equivalent, and that BCA 
as actually practised diverges in important 
ways from the logic of economic theory. 
4.4.  OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
ABOUT PRICES IN BCAS 
AND OTHER EEHS
For BCA, the fact that monetary equivalents do 
not arise from perfect and complete markets 
represents an objection in its own terms, i.e. it 
shows that the claims made by the theoretical 
underpinnings of BCA are not and cannot be 
fulfilled in practice. On the other hand, the 
defects of, in particular, market prices are not 
a strong objection for EEHs in general and, in 
particular, are not so for those adopting an 
extra-welfarist approach such as CEAs, DCEAs 
and ECEAs, since prices albeit imperfect 
nevertheless reflect financial opportunity cost 
for the public-sector decision-maker. 
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In spite of these objections, BCA holds 
for some [71] an attractive measurement 
strategy for EEHs, and BCAs are widely used 
in non-health domains [68, 69]. So, subject 
to ambiguity about the meaning of estimates 
of monetary equivalents, BCA allows for 
the comparison of health interventions with 
other public-sector activities (say, at the level 
of Treasury), and in addition it also provides, 
through its use of a single unit of account 
denominated in monetary terms, the benefit 
of informational compression facilitating 
the retention and communication of results. 
For both these reasons BCAs serve a useful 
purpose in mobilizing political will and in 
influencing donors and other international 
actors in health. 
4.5.  THE TABLE OF VALUES 
IN A BCA
To make the estimates of values explicit in a 
BCA, we recommend that a table of values 
complementing the table of accounts should 
be made explicit. Although we have so far 
shown prices integrated directly into the table 
of accounts, an explicit table of values for a 
BCA is a critical methodological element to 
document, given the difficulties inherent in 
estimating shadow prices.
In brief, for each of the items listed in the 
table of accounts, we recommend that 
the BCA practitioner should indicate the 
unit price (monetary equivalent) used and 
document how it was estimated. See Table 13 
for example categories where prices should be 
explicitly justified for a BCA. 
Table 13: Generic table of values for a BCA in health
Input values (Ps) Outcome values (Ps)
Market prices • Paid work costs (e.g. wages)
•  Equipment and machines unit prices 
(e.g. rental)
•  Medicines and consumables unit 
prices
• Facilities unit prices
• Other market-traded unit prices
•  Productivity prices (e.g. shadow 
wage differentials for increased 
productivity)
•  Labour-supply prices (e.g. shadow 
wages)
• Other non-market outcome prices
Shadow prices •  Beneficiaries’ unpaid work shadow 
prices
•  Volunteers’ unpaid work shadow 
prices
•  Other non-market-traded shadow 
prices
• Increased years of life shadow prices
•  Increased health-related quality of life 
shadow prices
•  Other non-market-valued shadow 
prices
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Investing in health is often a good choice 
for governments and individuals. However, 
funders demand evidence in the form of 
EEHs to help them separate good investments 
from less good ones. It is tempting to believe 
that there is a right answer to the question 
of what makes a good investment in health. 
However, there are many acceptable ways 
to answer this question: in this paper, we 
present a framework for thinking about some 
of the commonly used ways of capturing 
and organizing the value for money offered 
by investments in health. Our aim is not to 
promote a particular form of EEH but rather to 
encourage the thoughtful choice of methods 
within a broadly pluralistic approach. There 
are clearly trade-offs, however: more complex 
analyses give (in principle) a more complete 
picture of the advantages and disadvantages 
of a course of action, but at the same time 
they are more difficult and time-consuming to 
implement and less transparent to lay users; 
the principle of proportionality demands 
that the level and style of analysis should be 
appropriate given the burden of disease and 
the financial commitment required, but the 
principle of consistency demands that similar 
technologies should be analysed in a similar 
and comparable way. 
As unrestrained individual choice in 
healthcare may lead to a tragedy of the 
commons, so may undisciplined use of 
the technical methods of EEHs result in 
confusion and loss of credibility for public 
authorities and other stakeholders. Different 
health technology assessment agencies in 
Europe currently approach EEHs in very 
different ways, with the resulting duplication 
of effort and expense. These losses are 
inevitably passed on to the end-users of public 
services, and an unprincipled divergence in 
methods also limits opportunities for cross-
country learning. Though we don’t think an 
international body or donor should mandate 
any single form of EEH, we believe that 
countries and other stakeholders should 
coordinate better around forms of EEH that 
can obtain common assent and serve as a 
basis for best practice. 
Recognizing the role of important social 
value judgments (for example, regarding 
rationality and interpersonal comparisons), 
and assessing the realism and acceptability of 
simplifying assumptions on both the demand 
and supply sides, might be useful points of 
departure for anyone wondering which of the 
various forms of EEH is the one best suited for 
a particular purpose. EEH technicians need 
to be able to communicate about these issues 
and to suggest criteria for the benefit of those 
not only in parallel co-disciplines but also 
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